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Rediscovering the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Power:
Political and Constitutional Challenges to the Canadian Bankruptcy Act, 1919-1929
Thomas G. W. Telfer
[A]ll these questions—that is the rights of the parliament of Canada as against the provincial
legislature to legislate in matters of bankruptcy--will in due course come before the judicial
committee of the Privy Council.

S.W. Jacobs, House of Commons Debates, 26 March 19231
I. INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Canadian Bankruptcy Act of 19192 created a great deal of
optimism in the business and legal community. The new statute finally enabled Canada to
join other civilized nations, like England and the United States, that embraced bankruptcy
law as a permanent commercial statute.3 The idea of using a federal law to deal with
debtors and creditors was new to the Canadian legal world in 1919. Although s. 91(21) of
the Constitution Act, 1867 granted Parliament exclusive jurisdiction over “Bankruptcy
and Insolvency” the Dominion largely abandoned4 this federal power by repealing the
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House of Commons Debates, 14th Parl, 2nd Sess, vol II (26 March 1923) at 1519 (Jacobs, George Etienne
Cartier).
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Bankruptcy Act of 1919, SC 1919, c 36.
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For examples of optimism in the business community see Review of Lewis Duncan, The Law and
Practice of Bankruptcy in Canada (1922) 34 Jurid Rev 193; “Canada’s Bankruptcy Act”, The Globe (7
January 1920) 6; “Bankruptcy Act Will Help Business World: New Measure Wipes out Variety of
Provincial Laws” Financial Post (5 July 1919) 13 at 16; FM Moffat, “Bankruptcy in Canada” Financial
Post 21 (25 March 1927) 28; “Bankruptcy Act in Force July 1”, The Globe (6 January 1920) 2.
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Parliament did not completely abandon the field as it enacted legislation in 1882 to deal with insolvent
trading companies and banks: Thomas GW Telfer & Bruce L Welling, “The Winding-Up and Restructuring
Act: Realigning Insolvency’s Orphan to the Modern Law Reform Process” (2008) 24 BFLR 234 at 235.
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Insolvent Act5 in 18806 thereby enabling the provinces to pass debtor creditor legislation.
In 1919, there was an assumption that the new national bankruptcy law would improve
upon non-uniform provincial law.7 In the early 1920s, many lawyers believed that the
federal power was meant to be read broadly such that it would allow the Dominion to
interfere with provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights to make the
Bankruptcy Act more workable.8
From today’s perspective, the legal and business community’s optimism was well
placed. The Bankruptcy Act of 1919 has become Canada’s founding bankruptcy statute
and it established a permanent bankruptcy regime. On the constitutional side, if we look
at the evolution of the bankruptcy and insolvency power over the longer term, from 1919
“there has been a progressive expansion of the federal presence in the field.”9 However,
the permanency of the Bankruptcy Act and a broad interpretation of the bankruptcy power
were not inevitable or predictable outcomes in 1920. Some questioned Parliament’s
ability to pass legislation that interfered with decades old provincial debtor creditor law.10
5

Insolvent Act of 1875, SC 1875, c 16.
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An Act to Repeal the Acts Respecting Insolvency Now in Force in Canada, SC 1880, c 1. For the reasons
for repeal and the 1919 revival of bankruptcy law see Thomas GW Telfer, Ruin and Redemption: The
Struggle for a Canadian Bankruptcy Law, 1867-1919 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Osgoode
Society for Canadian Legal History, 2014).
“Dominion Association of Chartered Accountants: Address on Bankruptcy Act” 65:12 Monetary Times
(17 September 1920) 5 at 8. See also FM Moffat, “Bankruptcy in Canada” 21 Financial Post (25 March
1927) 28. One aspect of the new Act was not uniform. Section 25 of the Bankruptcy Act relied upon
provincial exemption law to determine exempt property in a bankruptcy. See Thomas GW Telfer, “The
Evolution of Bankruptcy Exemption Law in Canada 1867-1919: The Triumph of the Provincial Model”
[2007] Ann Rev Insol L 593.
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See e.g. Lewis Duncan, The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1922) at ix.

Roderick Wood, “The Paramountcy Principle in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law: The Latest Word
(2016) 58 CBLJ 27 at 29.
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Perhaps this is not surprising. Peter Hogg and Wade Wright note that the enumerated federal bankruptcy
and insolvency power was a subject matter that would “otherwise have come within property and civil
rights” jurisdiction of the provinces. Peter Hogg & Wade Wright, “Canadian Federalism, the Privy Council
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Indeed, many Quebec legal thinkers did not welcome the new federal statute as they
believed it to be a threat to the “purity of civil law.”11
During 1922 and 1923, there were calls from inside and outside Parliament to
repeal the Bankruptcy Act of 1919. Those seeking repeal sought to preserve provincial
law from federal interference. This provincial rights’ perspective ultimately surfaced in
constitutional cases where litigants sought to protect the property and civil rights
jurisdiction of the provinces from the intrusion of the Bankruptcy Act. In the 1928 case of
Royal Bank v. Larue12 the Privy Council ended the debate by reaffirming a broad federal
bankruptcy and insolvency power. Looking back from a long-term perspective, the
outcome in Larue might seem inevitable. However, until Larue there was a great deal of
uncertainty over the relationship between the federal bankruptcy power and provincial
jurisdiction. After nearly forty years of provincial rule, the shift to a federal statute was
an abrupt change for the provinces. The new federal bankruptcy order challenged
entrenched provincial law, and provincial rights’ advocates saw it as an attack on
carefully crafted provincial law that was more in tune with local needs.
This study examines the political and constitutional challenges to the Bankruptcy
Act from 1919 to 1929. The paper focuses on the 1920s for several reasons. The

and the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Debate about Canadian Federalism” (2005) 38:2 UBC L Rev
329 at 335.
Sylvio Normand, “Un thème dominant de la pensée juridique traditionnelle au Québec: La sauvegarde
de l’intégrité du droit civil” (1986-87) 32 McGill LJ 559 at 588. Original French: “Au Québec, les juristes
accueillent froidement la nouvelle loi, y voyant une menace évidente à la pureté du droit civil.” [translated
by author]. See also Louis-A. Pouliot, “Law Loi de Faillite et les Lois Provinciales” (1926-27) 5 R du D
104 at 110, 114; Louis-A. Pouliot, “La Loi de Faillite et les Lois Provinciales” (1926-27) 5 R du D 142 at
146.
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Royal Bank of Canada v Larue [1928] AC 187, 8 CBR 579 (PC).
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Bankruptcy Act of 1919 and the creation of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy in 193213
are important legislative milestones but in the literature there is little discussion of
bankruptcy law during the 1920s. This decade provides an opportunity to study how the
legal and business community responded to Parliament’s rediscovery of the federal
bankruptcy and insolvency power. The new Bankruptcy Act of 1919 provided a new
constitutional battle-ground for those seeking to preserve provincial law from federal
interference. Since Royal Bank v. Larue ruled in favour of a broad bankruptcy power in
1928 it provides the end-point of the study. The Great Depression is a distinct and
separate chapter in the life of Canadian bankruptcy law and federalism.14
The paper is divided into seven Parts. Part II provides the economic context of the
1920s and includes official bankruptcy statistics for the decade. Part III provides the
necessary constitutional law background by highlighting key nineteenth century cases on
the bankruptcy power. In Part IV, the paper considers how the legal and business
community defended a broad federal bankruptcy power. In contrast, Part V examines the
provincial rights’ response to the new Bankruptcy Act found in the political debates of the
Québec National Assembly and the House of Commons. Part VI details the constitutional
challenges to the federal bankruptcy power through an examination of reported case law
from the 1920s. Part VII concludes.
13

An Act to amend The Bankruptcy Act, SC 1932, c 39.

Parliament responded to the Great Depression with the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, SC
1933, c 36 and the Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement Act, SC Farmers’ Creditors Arrangement Act, SC
1934, c 53. On the constitutional litigation during the Great Depression legislation see: Virginia Torrie,
“Protagonists of Company Reorganization: A History of the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement (Canada)
and the Role of Large Secured Creditors” (PhD Thesis, University of Kent, 2015) at 118-127. See
Reference re Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (Canada), [1934] SCR 659, [1934] 4 DLR 75; British
Columbia (Attorney General) v Canada (Attorney General), [1936] SCR 384, 17 CBR 359, aff’d [1937]
AC 391, [1937] 1 DLR 695 (PC).
14
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II. THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT AND THE BRAVE NEW WORLD OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW
To better understand the challenges to the bankruptcy regime in the 1920s some
economic context is necessary. The economy struggled during the “Stuttering Twenties”
with a depression causing severe unemployment.15 For some areas of the country,
economic devastation started during the First World War. Southeastern Alberta and
southwestern Saskatchewan faced a severe drought in the decade following 1916. 16 In
1921, the Queen’s Quarterly reported that Canada was “somewhere near the middle of
the business depression.”17 The severe downturn lasted until 1925.18
The depression in the early 1920s is reflected in official bankruptcy statistics from
the Department of Trade and Commerce.19 In 1922, the number of bankruptcies peaked at

15

Michael Bliss, Northern Enterprise: Five Centuries of Canadian Business (Toronto: McClelland &
Stewart, 1987) at 381, 384. In 1923, the Home Bank of Canada, with seventy branches, failed. Lawrence
Kryzanowski and Gordon S. Roberts, “Canadian Banking Solvency, 1922-1940” (1993) 25: 3 J Money,
Credit & Banking 361 at 364. See Home Bank of Canada, Re, [1923] 54 O.L.R. 606, 4 DLR 891, (Ont.
H.C.) cited in Stephanie Ben-Ishai, “Bank Bankruptcy in Canada: A Comparative Perspective” (2009)
BFLR 25 at 60.
See David C Jones, “We’ll All be Buried Down Here” The Prairie Dryland Disaster 1917-1926
(Calgary: Historical Society of Alberta, 1986) at xxix; David C. Jones, Empire of Dust: Settling and
Abandoning the Prairie Dry Belt (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 1987); Curtis R McManus,
Happyland: A History of the ‘Dirty Thirties in Saskatchewan, 1914-1937 (Calgary, University of Calgary
Press, 2011).
16

“Business Cycles and the Depression of 1920-21” (1921) 29 Queen’s Quarterly 60. See also Angus
Lyell, “The Bankruptcy Act in Operation” 66:2 Monetary Times (14 January 1921) 26; HP Grundy,
“Bankruptcy Act a Real Benefit” 78:24 Monetary Times (17 June 1927) 14.
17

James Struthers, “Prelude to the Depression: The Federal Government and Unemployment, 1918-29”
(1977) 58:3 Can Hist Rev 277.
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1921 is the first full year under the new bankruptcy regime since it came into effect on July 1, 1920. For
bankruptcy statistics for the calendar year 1921, see House of Commons Debates, 14th Parl, 2nd Sess, vol I
(8 March 1923) at 938. For bankruptcy statistics for 1922 to 1924, see Canada, Department of Trade and
Commerce, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, “Commercial Failures in Canada December 1925”, (Ottawa:
DTC, 1925) at 7; for 1925 to 1931, see Canada, Department of Trade and Commerce, Dominion Bureau of
Statistics, “Commercial Failures in Canada for December 1931 With Totals for the Calendar Year 1931”,
(Ottawa: DTC, 1932) at 8.
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3,925. Bankruptcies never reached this level during the Great Depression.20 The
bankruptcy statistics did not go unnoticed. In 1923, a Member of Parliament referred to
the rising bankruptcy numbers as “an enormous total in a land of unlimited resources, a
land whose people are willing workers, a land…which offers every possible stimulus to
progress.”21 Within two years of the Bankruptcy Act coming into force Canada
experienced a significant bankruptcy crisis. This may have contributed to the belief that
there was something inherently wrong with the bankruptcy regime.

20

For bankruptcy statistics for 1932 to 1941, see Canada, Department of Trade and Commerce, Dominion
Bureau of Statistics, “Commercial Failures in Canada in the Calendar Year 1941 and in December 1941”,
(Ottawa: DTC, 1942) at 3.
21

House of Commons Debates, 14th Parl, 2nd Sess, vol I (26 February 1923) at 648.
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Total Number of Reported Bankruptcies in Canada
(1921 – 1929)
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Rising numbers of bankruptcies in the early twenties occurred at a time when
the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act were only becoming known. The absence of a
national bankruptcy law for nearly forty years meant that there was a lack of expertise
among lawyers and trustees in bankruptcy. A Canadian Law Times book review
acknowledged that “few in the Legal Profession of Canada know anything of

9
Bankruptcy Law in operation.”22 Lawyers “owing to the novelty of the Law, are
just familiarizing themselves with it.”23
The new legislation created interpretative challenges. The legal community
understood that the Bankruptcy Act was not a self-contained code24 and that to discover
the meaning of the statute one had to resort to case law.25 But early commentary
lamented that little case law had yet to emerge.26 The uncertainty ushered in by the new
Act is best illustrated by a 1921 book review of an English27 bankruptcy text published
in the Canada Law Journal. The reviewer suggested that the English book might offer
some interpretative assistance:
We of this Dominion are now again paddling our little canoe in the troubled
waters of insolvency, and will be glad of any assistance for our new venture as set
forth in the Dominion Statutes of 1920, in the Act which came into force on July
1st of this year.28

Lawyers practicing in the French language faced a further problem. In January
1922, Lewis Duncan reported in his bankruptcy text that “owing to prevailing prices,
22

Book Review of A Short View of Bankruptcy Laws by Edward Mason, (1920) 40 Can L Times 1058 at
1058. See also Angus Lyell, “The Bankruptcy Act and its Defects” 33:10 Saturday Night (20 December
1919) 27
23

Book Review of The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy Law in Canada by Lewis Duncan, (1922) 42 Can
L Times 215.
Professor JT Herbert, “An Unsolicited Report on Legal Education in Canada” (1921) 41 Can L Times
593.
24

Professor JT Herbert, “An Unsolicited Report on Legal Education in Canada” (1921) 41 Can L Times
593.
25
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Book Review of The Law and Practice in Bankruptcy, 12th ed, by Right Hon RL VaughnWilliams & William Mansell, (1921) 57:12 Can LJ 286.
27

The Canadian Bankruptcy Act of 1919 was based upon the English Bankruptcy Act of 1914, however,
there were significant differences. Duncan, in his text, made no apologies for relying upon English case
law. See Lewis Duncan, The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1922) at viii.
28

Book Review of The Law and Practice in Bankruptcy, 12th ed, by Right Hon RL Vaughn-Williams &
William Mansell, (1921) 57:12 Can LJ 286.
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the publishers had not seen their way clear to print the French text of the Act and
Rules.”29 Parliament added to the chaos by amending the Act three times by the end of
the 1922.30 This caused Greenshields J. of the Québec Court of Appeal to state that
during the “short period of life of the Act”31 Parliament had amended the Act such that
“it is scarcely recognizable in its present form.” Greenshields J. urged that other
amendments could be made “making clear what is evidently ambiguous.”32
The rising number of bankruptcies and the uncertain state of the law left the
legislation open to widespread criticism. Months after Parliament proclaimed the Act,
the Toronto weekly, Saturday Night published an article entitled: “The Bankruptcy Act
and its Defects”.33 The author described the Act as “cumbersome”34 and lamented its
many “loopholes”.35 Saturday Night published a follow up article entitled: “Present
Canadian Bankruptcy Act will not Do”.36 The article called for amendments to “clarify
the obscurity which now hangs in a cloud” over the Act
29

37

One author predicted

Lewis Duncan, The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1922) at ix.

30

An Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, SC 1920, c 34; An Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, SC 1921, c
17; An Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, SC 1922, c 8,
John W Danforth v The Riordon Co., [1922] 1 DLR 843 at 852 (Que CA), rev’d on other grounds
Riordon Co v John W Danforth Co, [1923] SCR 319.
31

John W Danforth v The Riordon Co [1922] 1 DLR 843 at 852 (Que CA), rev’d on other grounds Riordon
Co v John W Danforth Co, [1923] SCR 319.
32

Angus Lyell, “The Bankruptcy Act and its Defects” 33:10 Saturday Night 27 (20 December 1919) 27.
During this era Saturday Night represented the views of “upper middle-class English-speaking
Torontonians.” See Index to Saturday Night, Libris Canadiana, online: <www.Libris.ca>.
33

34

Angus Lyell, “The Bankruptcy Act and its Defects” 33:10 Saturday Night (20 December 1919) 27.
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Angus Lyell, “The Bankruptcy Act and its Defects” 33:10 Saturday Night (20 December 1919) 27.

Terence Sheard, “Present Canadian Bankruptcy Act Will Not Do”) 40:9 Saturday Night (17 January
1925) 13.
36

Terence Sheard, “Present Canadian Bankruptcy Act Will Not Do” 40:9 Saturday Night (17 January
1925) 13 at 18.
37
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“radical amendments” after one or two years of experience with the new Act.38 The
lack of government supervision of trustees in bankruptcy, who were responsible for
administering bankrupt estates, also provided a source of opposition to the new
legislation.39 One author suggested that bankrupt estates “were actually administered
by persons who had been convicted of offences or who were bankrupt.”40
In the 1920s, critics of the Bankruptcy Act also drew upon the nineteenth century
belief that debtors had a moral obligation to re-pay debts.41 Saskatchewan businesses
raised the concern about the ease with which insolvent debtors could “pass through the
Bankruptcy Court and escape their obligations.”42 The Regina Leader reported that in
Saskatchewan debtors could declare bankruptcy every three months and then start
business again after each bankruptcy filing. Too many debtors were getting back into
bankruptcy “before they had spent sufficient time on the penitent bench.”43 Thus,
“whole moral fabric of business is being endangered” by debtor practices. 44 The
Québec government complained that the Bankruptcy Act was too lenient and prevented

Angus Lyell, “Bankruptcy Act in Operation” 66:2 Monetary Times (14 January 1921) 26. See also call
for amendments in “The Bankruptcy Act” (1921) 57:2 Can LJ 41 at 44.
38

Bram Thomson, “Canadian Bankruptcy Act—Monopoly of the Trusteeship and of the Law” (1921) 41
Can LT 96. The trustee problem will be considered in a future study: Thomas GW Telfer, “The New
Bankruptcy ‘Detective Agency’? The Origins of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy in Great Depression
Canada” The Canadian Confederation: Past, Present, and Future Conference (Université de Montréal,
Quebec May 16-18, 2017).
39

40

Lewis Duncan, “The Bankruptcy Amendment Act of 1932” (1932) 2 Fortnightly LJ 83.

“Creditors Given Absolute Control under Bankruptcy” 17 Financial Post (1 June 1923) 13. See also
“Repeated Bankruptcies” (1923) 3 CBR 721.
41

42

“Bankruptcy Should be Unprofitable” 17 Financial Post (9 March 1923) 10.

“Bankruptcy Should be Unprofitable” Regina Leader as reported by 17 Financial Post (9 March 1923)
10.
43

44

“Bankruptcy Should be Unprofitable” 17 Financial Post (9 March 1923) 10.
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farmers from obtaining credit in the province.45 Conversely, the legislation was
criticized for making it too hard for debtors to access relief. In “drought-stricken prairie
areas” insolvent farmers had difficulty in obtaining their discharge due to high fees and
because of the obligation under the Act to keep proper books.46 These beliefs cultivated
popular feelings of mistrust in the new federal legislation.
Professor John Falconbridge published a powerful critique of the Bankruptcy Act
in the Canadian Bar Review in 1926. The article, simply entitled “Why?”,47
accumulated 17 detailed and largely technical interpretive questions that had emerged
as Falconbridge prepared his Bankruptcy lectures for his Osgoode Hall class.
Falconbridge called for a serious effort to improve the drafting of the Act.48 Parliament
sought to remedy the numerous defects by passing six amending Acts between 1920
and 1927.49 However, such legislation could not forestall the provincial rights
movement and constitutional litigation which would eventually end up before the Privy
Council in 1928.
III.

THE

BANKRUPTCY

AND

INSOLVENCY

POWER

IN

THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY
To provide context for the political and constitutional challenges to the
Bankruptcy Act in the 1920s it is necessary to briefly review nineteenth century

45

Hector B McKinnon, “Bankruptcy Act Warmly Attacked” The Globe (18 July 1924) 3.
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Hector B McKinnon, “Bankruptcy Act Warmly Attacked” The Globe (18 July 1924) 3.
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John Falconbridge, “Why?” (1926) 4:10 Can Bar Rev 695.
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John Falconbridge, “Why?” (1926) 4:10 Can Bar Rev 695.

49

Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, SC 1920, c 34; Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, SC 1921, c 17; Act
to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, SC 1922, c 8; Act to Amend the Bankruptcy Act, SC 1923, c 31; Act to
Amend the Bankruptcy Act, SC 1925, c 31; Act Respecting Bankruptcy, RSC 1927, c 11.
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jurisprudence on the bankruptcy and insolvency power.50 Two key nineteenth century
decisions of the Privy Council influenced the direction of case law in the 1920s. In
1880, the Privy Council provided a very clear answer to the question of the relationship
between the federal bankruptcy power and provincial jurisdiction over property and
civil rights. In Cushing v Dupuy,51 the Privy Council concluded: “it would be
impossible to advance a step”52 in bankruptcy proceedings “without interfering with
and modifying some of the ordinary rights of property, and other civil rights.”53
It is therefore to be presumed, indeed it is a necessary implication, that the Imperial
statute, in assigning to the Dominion Parliament the subjects of bankruptcy and
insolvency, intended to confer on it legislative power to interfere with property, civil
rights, and procedure within the Provinces, so far as a general law relating to those
subjects might affect them. 54

The Privy Council effectively recognized that “the federal power over bankruptcy and
insolvency could not be effective if it did not authorize substantial modifications of the
ordinary rights of property and contract.”55

With the repeal of the federal Insolvent Act in 1880, questions arose about the
constitutionality of the provincial assignments and preferences legislation in the

50

See also, Thomas GW Telfer, Ruin and Redemption: The Struggle for a Canadian Bankruptcy Law,
1867-1919 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2014) at
94-95, 116-125.
51

(1880), 5 App Cas 409.

52

Cushing v Dupuy (1880), 5 App Cas 409 at 415, 416.

53

Cushing v Dupuy (1880), 5 App Cas 409 at 415, 416.

54

Cushing v Dupuy (1880), 5 App Cas 409 at 415, 416. The Supreme Court of Canada in 1883 followed
the lead of Cushing v Dupuy and adopted the principle that Parliament had a broad right under its
bankruptcy power to interfere with property and civil rights. See Shields v Peak (1883) 8 S.C.R. 579.
55

Peter Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 2007) (loose-leaf updated 2015, release
1) ch 25 at 3.
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absence of a federal bankruptcy statute.56 In 1894, the Privy Council upheld a
provision of an Ontario Act in Ontario (Attorney General) v Canada (Attorney
General)[Voluntary Assignments Case].57 The decision had two immediate impacts.
First, it enabled the provincial era of debtor-creditor regulation to continue unscathed.58
Second, the decision effectively stalled federal bankruptcy reform efforts. However,
over the longer term, the case also had significant constitutional consequences for the
interpretation of the federal bankruptcy power.
Given that the Privy Council did not find the provincial provision ultra vires, one
might argue that the Voluntary Assignments Case interpreted the bankruptcy power
narrowly.59 Further, one might align the outcome in the case with a broader trend in
federalism jurisprudence at the end of the nineteenth century that saw the Privy
Council, under Lord Watson, limit the powers of Parliament.60 However, a portion of
the judgment supported a broad reading of the bankruptcy power.
56

Thomas GW Telfer, Ruin and Redemption: The Struggle for a Canadian Bankruptcy Law, 1867-1919
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2014) at 116-126.
57

[1894] AC 189 (PC).

58

Thomas GW Telfer, Ruin and Redemption: The Struggle for a Canadian Bankruptcy Law, 1867-1919
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History, 2014) at 122-126.
59

Albert Bohémier, Faillite et Insolvabilité, vol 1, (Montreal: Éditions Thémis, 1992) at 24, cited in,
Canada, Department of Justice, “Bankruptcy and Insolvency, by Albert Bohémier, a study presented to the
Civil Law Section of the Department of Justice of Canada, online: <http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/csjsjc/harmonization/bohemier/bankr-failli.html#ednref2>. See also W Ivor Jennings, “Constitutional
Interpretation: The Experience of Canada” (1937-38) 51 Harv L Rev 1 at 13. John T Saywell’s analysis of
Lord Watson’s interjections during arguments demonstrates that the Board favoured allowing the provinces
to act while the Dominion did not exercise its bankruptcy power. See John T Saywell, The Lawmakers:
Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Osgoode
Society for Canadian Legal History) at 130-132.
60

JR Mallory, Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada (University of Toronto Press, 1954) at 29.
See also Peter Hogg & Wade Wright, “Canadian Federalism, the Privy Council and the Supreme Court:
Reflections on the Debate about Canadian Federalism” (2005) 38:2 UBC L Rev 329 at 339. See also John
T Saywell, The Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shaping of Canadian Federalism (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History) at 114-116.
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In 1894, leading constitutional scholar A.H.F. Lefroy61 concluded that the Voluntary
Assignments Case “possesses much constitutional interest by reason of the dicta in the
concluding portions”62 of the decision. In the second last paragraph of the judgment the
Lord Chancellor,63 Lord Herschell64 took the opportunity to re-state the breadth of that
federal bankruptcy power:
[A] system of bankruptcy legislation may frequently require various ancillary provisions
for the purpose of preventing the scheme of the Act from being defeated. It may be
necessary for this purpose to deal with the effect of executions and other matters which
would otherwise be within the legislative competence of the provincial legislature.
Their Lordships do not doubt that it would be open to the Dominion Parliament to deal
with such matters as part of a bankruptcy law, and the provincial legislature would
doubtless be then precluded from interfering with this legislation in as much as such
interference would affect the bankruptcy law of the Dominion Parliament.65

Lefroy reasoned that the effect of this Privy Council statement was “one of the first
instances of the Dominion Parliament ‘scoring’ before the Privy Council.”66 Confident

See RCB Risk, “A.H.F. Lefroy: Common Law Thought in Late Nineteenth Century Canada—On
Burying One’s Grandfather” in G Blaine Baker & Jim Phillips, eds, A History of Canadian Legal Thought:
Collected Essays (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History,
2006) at 66.
61

AHF Lefroy, “The Privy Council on Bankruptcy” (1894) 30:6 Can LJ (NS) 182 at 186. Lord Herschell’s
statement has also be characterized as obiter by a modern authority. See Pierre Carignan, “La Competence
Legislative en Matiere de Faillite et d’Insolvabilite” (1979) 57 Can Bar Rev 47 at 61.
62

63

See RFV Heuston, The Lives of the Lord Chancellors (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964) at 102.

64

Perhaps it is not surprising that Lord Herschell took the opportunity to emphasize the federal bankruptcy
power. Before becoming Lord Chancellor, Farrer Herschell had served as Solicitor General at the time
England enacted a comprehensive Bankruptcy Act in 1883 with many crediting his leading role in obtaining
the passage of the Bill. See The Right Honourable Lord James of Hereford, “The Late Lord Herschell, In
Memoriam” (1899) 1:2 J Soc Comp Legis n.s. 201 at 202. See also Patrick Polden, “Farrer Herschell” in
HCG Matthew & Brian Harrison, eds, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2004); EM, “Builders of our Law: Lord Herschell” (1902-3) 2:2 Can L Rev 88 at 90. For
a summary of a realist vision of statutory interpretation see Randal Graham, “What Judges Want: Judicial
Self-interest and Statutory Interpretation” (2009) 30:1 Statute LR 38 at 42-51.
65

Ontario (Attorney General) v Canada (Attorney General) [1894] AC 189 (PC) at para 27.

66

AHF Lefroy, “The Privy Council on Bankruptcy” (1894) 30:6 Can LJ (NS) 182 at 193.
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of the importance of this dicta, Lefroy concluded that in considering how much
provincial jurisdiction might be “incidentally invaded”67 by Parliament:
[T]heir lordships seem to have left it, in its relation to the provincial legislatures, almost in
as happy a position as a man occupied towards his wife in the good old days, when he
could say, “What is yours is mine, but what is mine's my own.”68

In 1894, Lord Herschell’s statements on the scope of Dominion power did not
have an immediate impact as there was no federal bankruptcy statute. But his dicta and
the finding in Cushing v Dupuy would be locked away in the law books ready to be
used whenever federal law was revived.69 After Parliament enacted a new bankruptcy
law in 1919, Lord Herschell’s dicta ultimately became entrenched as part of Canadian
law.
IV. THE BANKRUPTCY POWER AT THE OUTSET OF THE 1920s
Defenders of a broad federal bankruptcy power at the beginning of the 1920s
relied upon nineteenth century constitutional case law to address any concerns about
the validity of the federal law and the possibility of encroaching upon provincial
property and civil rights jurisdiction.70 The drafter of the Bankruptcy Act, HP
Grundy,71 published a “Synopsis of the Canadian Bankruptcy Act” in 1920.72 To
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answer the question of the constitutionality of the new Act, Grundy simply quoted
from Cushing v Dupuy and the Voluntary Assignments Case and stated:
It would accordingly appear that in case any conflict should arise between the Dominion
Act and any provincial Act on the subject of bankruptcy and insolvency or matters
ancillary thereto, even if such ancillary matters would ordinarily be within the powers of
the provincial legislation, the provisions of the Dominion Act would prevail.73

J.A.C. Cameron, a Master in Chambers, Supreme Court of Ontario 74 published
the first Canadian bankruptcy text in 1920.75 Citing Cushing v Dupuy and the
Voluntary Assignments Case, Cameron concluded that the Bankruptcy Act of 1919 was
a direct interference with provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights. He
asked, “has the Dominion Parliament jurisdiction to enact the present legislation? It is
submitted that it has.”76 Certain provisions of the Bankruptcy Act directly related to
civil procedure and “would repeal by implication any conflicting provincial statutes.”77
Specifically referring to Lord Herschell’s dicta in the Voluntary Assignments Case
(although by 1920 the passage was embraced as a general principle and it was no
longer referred to as dicta) Cameron reasoned that if provincial legislation had an
effect of interfering with the Bankruptcy Act then such provincial legislation would be
ultra vires.78
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In 1922, Lewis Duncan, a Toronto lawyer,79 published The Law and Practice of
Bankruptcy in Canada.80 Duncan also cited Cushing v Dupuy and the Voluntary
Assignments Case to support a broad federal bankruptcy power. The Voluntary
Assignments Case was of “considerable importance.”81 The case enabled Parliament to
“pass complete and fully rounded legislation.” 82
Dominion provisions which are truly ancillary or…necessarily incidental to a general
bankruptcy or insolvency law may effect a virtual repeal of provincial legislation. There
can be no direct repeal; but if the two are in conflict the Dominion enactment must
prevail.83

It was inevitable that the defense of the federal power also involved direct attacks
on provincial law and provincial jurisdiction since there were many provincial statutes
that might infringe upon the newly exercised federal bankruptcy power. Federal law
would do away with the “cumbersome and unsatisfactory” provincial law that involved
“tedious delays and heavy expenses.”84 However, criticisms of provincial law went
beyond claims of inefficiency. On July 5, 1919 the Financial Post headline read,
“Bankruptcy Act will Help Business World: New Measure Wipes out Variety of

Lewis Duncan, would later challenge Lord Haldane’s view of Confederation in constitutional arguments
before the Privy Council. See John T Saywell, The Lawmakers: Judicial Power and the Shaping of
Canadian Federalism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, Osgoode Society for Canadian Legal History,
2002) at 163-64, 168, 179.
79

80

Lewis Duncan, The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1922). Unlike
Cameron’s work Duncan provided a substantial text of more than 700 pages. See Bram Thompson, Book
Review of The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Canada by Lewis Duncan, (1922) 42 Can L Times 215.
The reviewer claimed that the need for such a “reliable work” had become “urgent”.
81

Lewis Duncan, The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1922) at 24.

82

Lewis Duncan, The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1922) at 24.

83

Lewis Duncan, The Law and Practice of Bankruptcy in Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1922) at 24. The
ability to rely on Cushing v Dupuy as a statement of the broad bankruptcy power was not accepted by all.
See Louis-A Pouliot, “La Loi de Faillite et les Lois Provinciales” (1926-27) 5 R du D 104 at 114.
84

“Canada’s Bankruptcy Act” The Globe (7 January 1920) 6.

19
Provincial Laws”.85 In 1921, the Monetary Times stated: “there is no doubt that the
Dominion statute rides across provincial enactments here and there.”86 The Globe
proclaimed that the Bankruptcy Act would “abrogate and annul existing Provincial
laws.”87
V. THE PROVINCIAL RESPONSE TO THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF 1919
The attack on provincial law did not go unnoticed. In 1921, the Monetary Times
reported that some of the provincial governments had complained that the Bankruptcy Act
“overrides a good deal of provincial legislation.”88 In that same year, the Canada Law
Times published an article calling for the amendment of the Bankruptcy Act to make it
clear that the administration of voluntary assignments and receiving orders were to be
governed by “the general laws of the Province affecting the transfer of property.”89
Two provinces forged ahead with their own means of debtor relief legislation. In
response to the economic devastation in the West, Alberta and Saskatchewan passed debt
adjustment legislation90 designed to “relieve the distress of resident farmers.”91 The
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legislation protected the farmer from “execution and foreclosure” and gave administrative
boards the “power to prevent a creditor from using oppressively the machinery provided
by law to enable a creditor to assert his rights against his debtor.”92 Although the Alberta
Debt Adjustment Act was ultimately ruled to be ultra vires by the Privy Council in
1943,93 the debt adjustment legislation of the 1920s marked an aggressive move by two
prairie provinces that must have considered the new Bankruptcy Act “insufficient or
poorly suited to their regional needs.”94
Politicians in the Quebec National Assembly and some Quebec Liberal MPs
launched political attacks against the Bankruptcy Act. In challenging the new federal
statute politicians also raised constitutional arguments against the federal bankruptcy
power which they claimed interfered with provincial jurisdiction. These constitutional
arguments, perhaps strategically raised in the political arena, eventually found their way
into lower court constitutional judgments in Quebec. In December 1922, the National
Assembly of Québec adopted a resolution inviting the federal government to revoke the
Bankruptcy Act of 1919. According to the resolution, the Bankruptcy Act invited
dishonesty, and fraud and ruined credit.95 Members of the National Assembly were also
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concerned about the intrusiveness of the federal law and sought to defend Québec civil
law. Louis Létourneau claimed that the federal bankruptcy law “makes litter of the spirit
and letter of our codes.”96 The forty-year experience of provincial jurisprudence under
the Civil Code “was set to zero and replaced by federal legislation.” 97 Québec law
relating to the transfer of property “was abolished and became a dead letter.”98
Létourneau claimed that the Bankruptcy Act “violated the constitution of the country
since it trampled underfoot the rights and prerogatives of the legislatures in matters of
civil law.”99 Québec Liberal Premier, Louis-Alexandre Taschereau100 opened his speech
with a direct attack on the federal bankruptcy law claiming it was “an ultra vires act”.101
He announced that he would convene a committee of Québec jurists to study the
Bankruptcy Act. If the committee concluded that the bankruptcy legislation was
unconstitutional, the government of Québec would challenge the legislation in the
Supreme Court of Canada and the Privy Council. Taschereau promised to do everything
possible to have the Bankruptcy Act set aside “and have the province return to the
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provisions of the Civil Code in regard bankruptcy, and, once again, be master at
home.”102
Provincial rights arguments also surfaced in the House of Commons in 1923.103 A
number of Liberal Quebec MPs opposed the Bankruptcy Act.104 On March 26, 1923,
Quebec Liberal MP Pierre-François Casgrain moved that the Bankruptcy Act should be
amended or abrogated.105 While Casgrain criticized the law for being too easy on debtors
and doing little to regulate trustees, he also took the position that the Bankruptcy Act
“encroaches on our provincial law, on our civil code and procedure.”106 The federal Act
has been the source of trouble in Québec with Casgrain claiming that “we have been
forced to spend large sums to ensure the maintenance of our rights” under provincial
law.107 Casgrain proposed that if the federal statute was not to be repealed then the
Bankruptcy Act should not apply to Québec. In this way, the rights of Québec would be
protected and it would allow for the civil code and code of civil procedure to be
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“maintained in integrity.”108 A fellow Liberal MP from Québec, John Joseph Denis,
urged the House not to force the federal legislation on Québec which “does not desire to
accept” the law.109
Legislators questioned the need for a federal Bankruptcy Act given that provincial
debtor-creditor legislation had worked for forty years. Joseph Archambault, a Québec
Liberal MP reminded the House that Québec civil law had adequately dealt with debtors
but had now been practically “abolished by the federal Bankruptcy Act.” 110 Archambault
advocated for a return to provincial law as there was “no necessity for uniformity in a
bankruptcy law.”111 In his concluding remarks, Archambault strongly defended
provincial jurisdiction: “I do submit that when the law of bankruptcy is so closely related
to civil rights, the Dominion parliament should be very chary about legislating in this
area.”112 Paul Mercier, another Liberal MP from Québec, supported the retention of
provincial law. Provincial law “had been enacted according to provincial necessities and
customs.” In contrast, Parliament had constructed a bankruptcy law “for the whole
Dominion…without consulting the provincial attorneys-general and the legislatures.”113
There was a fear in Québec that the bankruptcy legislation was part of a larger trend to
centralize law at the expense of provincial jurisdiction:
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The tendency to centralize and unify legislation is becoming more and more visible…and
there seems to be an admitted attempt to encroach on provincial rights and attack our civil
laws.114

In Quebec, there was also a belief that Parliament was seeking to impose English
law on the province. In 1923, the Monetary Times published an editorial:
Quite probably Quebec would also be better satisfied were it not for the fact that the
bankruptcy legislation is an effort to impose English law, and that this may be but the
first effort for much other legislation of a like nature.115

John-Joseph Denis a Québec Liberal MP gave voice to this idea in the House of
Commons in 1923 during the repeal debate. Denis pointed out that the Canadian
Bankruptcy Act had been transplanted from England and that he opposed “the importation
of laws from England.”116 The Act was a “replica of an English law, passed some forty
years ago. We have had too much copying of English laws in this country.” Denis argued
that conditions in Europe were much different than the situation in Canada. He objected
to the bankruptcy law because it was “not suited to the people of Canada.” In particular,
the Bankruptcy Act was “not suited to the requirements” of the Québec people.117
Casgrain, who had moved the motion for repeal concluded the debate by noting that
Québec “is afraid of any invasion of English law under the new system.”118 Casgrain
ultimately withdrew his repeal motion.119
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The concerns raised by Quebec politicians were consistent with “traditional legal
thought in Quebec.”120 Sylvio Normand’s study of Revue du Droit articles published
during the 1920s demonstrates that there was a “a dominant theme” of protecting “the
integrity of civil law”.121 Quebec authors opposed the unification of Canadian law,
appeals to the Privy Council and the spread of federal statutes.122 Bankruptcy law allowed
the civil code to be infiltrated by “foreign law” through the use of jurisprudence from
other provinces.123 The Bankruptcy Act could “not cause a creditor to lose any rights or
privileges” acquired under provincial law.124 More importantly the new bankruptcy
regime permitted bankrupts to obtain a discharge from their debts. Before 1919, this
remedy was not available under provincial law. The Bankruptcy Act, therefore, interfered
with Quebec civil law by introducing a new means of debt relief.125 The only solution
was repeal.126
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In the House of Commons federalists responded to the Quebec position.127 SW
Jacobs, also a Quebec Liberal MP,128

challenged the Québec perspective of the

Constitution offered by his colleagues in the House:
It is wrong for our people in…Quebec to say that the act, which the Parliament of Canada
has a right to impose on the whole of the Dominion of Canada, is an attempt to take from
the people of the province of Quebec their civil rights and their civil law.129

Jacobs argued that it was not for the House of Commons to “sit in judgment and declare
whether it was unconstitutional.”130 Rather, Jacobs argued, that was the role of the
courts.131
[A]ll these questions—that is the rights of the parliament of Canada, as against the
provincial legislature, to legislate in matters of bankruptcy—will in due course come
before the judicial committee of the Privy Council.132

Jacobs was correct in his prediction with the Privy Council finally ruling in 1928 in
favour of a broad bankruptcy power. However, before 1928 several lower court decisions
challenged the federal intrusion into provincial matters. Some of the constitutional
arguments found in the debates of the Québec National Assembly and in Parliament
eventually found their way into Québec lower court judgments.
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VI. THE BANKRUPTCY

POWER INTERPRETED: CONSTITUTIONAL

LITIGATION DURING THE 1920s
The question of whether to repeal the Bankruptcy Act soon gave way to
constitutional litigation over the scope of the federal bankruptcy power. Perhaps this is
not surprising. J.R. Mallory argues that new legislation inevitably produces litigation
which seeks “to exploit the federal division of legislative powers in the constitution” as a
way of “minimizing the change” created by the statute.133 The change in this context
involved the end of a near forty-year period of provincial regulation of debtor creditor
matters without federal interference. After the long provincial era, the Bankruptcy Act
marked “a very radical change.”134 Those who hoped for an eventual Privy Council ruling
in favour of the Dominion in the 1920s had to contend with the possibility that Lord
Haldane, who served on the Privy Council until 1928, would hear an appeal on the scope
of the bankruptcy power. Lord Haldane had played a dominant role in reshaping
Canadian constitutional law and in his judgments Lord Haldane “subordinat[ed]... federal
power to provincial power, whenever the language of the 1867 Act allowed.”135 From
Quebec there was an attempt to use Lord Haldane’s federalism jurisprudence to challenge
the Privy Council’s nineteenth century characterization of a broad bankruptcy power.
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One Quebec lawyer suggested that Privy Council jurisprudence had evolved since the
1880 decision of Cushing v Dupuy.136 Relying upon a 1925 Lord Haldane judgment137 the
lawyer claimed that “the power of the provincial legislatures to regulate civil and
property rights cannot easily be impeded.”138 As the decade grew to a close, RCB Risk
notes: “the Dominion’s powers seemed to many Canadians to be a pale image of what
had been contemplated at Confederation.”139 Would the bankruptcy power suffer the
same fate? Some early decisions on the bankruptcy power did not favour the Dominion.
The Quebec Superior Court found a provision of the Bankruptcy Act to be ultra vires and
several other decisions cast doubt on the federal ability to interfere with property and
civil rights.
A. EARLY CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
Although nineteenth century jurisprudence favoured an extensive bankruptcy
power, there was little consensus in early court rulings on the relationship between the
Bankruptcy Act and provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights.

Some cases

gave emphasis to the priority of federal law.140 Thus, Justice Fisher of the Ontario
Supreme Court characterized the 1880 decision of Cushing v Dupuy to mean that “the
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Parliament of Canada had the right to pass legislation pertaining to the subject of
bankruptcy and insolvency and in doing so had the right to override provincial
legislation.”141 However, not all courts initially accepted this premise with many
decisions of the 1920s adopting a perspective that focused on preserving provincial
law.142
Whether the Bankruptcy Act overrode143 provincial legislation was the essential
issue before the Québec Court of Appeal in Re Rosenzweig in 1921.144 Under provisions
of the Québec Civil Code, an unpaid seller was entitled to the right of rescission against
an insolvent trader.145 In this case, the seller sold goods for an immediate cash payment
of half of the selling price with the balance due within thirty days. On the day of the
delivery the buyer became bankrupt leading the unpaid seller to assert a right of
rescission under the Quebec Civil Code. The trustee refused to recognize the seller’s right
of rescission and retained the goods for the benefit of the estate. The conflicting positions
of the trustee and the seller forced the Court to consider was whether the bankruptcy of
the buyer affected the right of the unpaid seller under provincial law. Lamothe C.J. asked
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the question this way: “Has the new bankruptcy law made away with the privileged right
conferred to the seller by Art. 1543, Civil Code?”146 He answered the question by
proclaiming that “there is no text of The Bankruptcy Act which says so.”147 The trustee
argued that the Bankruptcy Act “abolished by implication”148 the unpaid seller’s right of
rescission. Lamothe C.J. concluded: “Abrogation by implication, in civilized countries, is
not easily admitted.”149 Abrogation of rights arising under provincial law was “not to be
presumed.”150 In a concurring opinion Tellier J. offered a similar sentiment: “The
Bankruptcy Act has effected no change in our former laws concerning sale. The
privileged rights of the unpaid seller are still the same, they have not been affected.” 151
The Court of Appeal concluded that the unpaid seller’s right of rescission survived the
bankruptcy.152
In 1923, the Québec Superior Court ruled that a provision of the Bankruptcy Act
was ultra vires. In Re Stober, the terms of a commercial lease provided that in the event
of the insolvency of the lessee, the lease became null and void. It was a further term of
the agreement that the lease could not be assigned without the consent of the landlord. On
the bankruptcy of the tenant, the landlord provided the trustee with notice claiming that
the lease was null and void. The trustee relied on s. 52 of the Bankruptcy Act to retain the
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leased premises for the remainder of the unexpired term. Specifically, the trustee relied
upon s. 52(5) which gave the trustee rights “notwithstanding the legal effect of any
provision or stipulation in any lease.” According to the trustee, this subsection allowed
him to ignore the terms of the lease and obtain possession of the premises for the
purposes of an assignment of the lease to a third party.
The landlord argued that s. 52 of the Bankruptcy Act interfered with
“contractual rights” and allowed “the annulment of private contracts.” Thus, s. 52
“legislate[s] on matters affecting civil rights and property…which are constitutionally
within the sole jurisdiction of the province.”153 The landlord took the position that s.
52(5) of the Bankruptcy Act was “illegal and unconstitutional and is ultra vires of the
powers of the Federal Parliament.”154 Therefore, under Québec civil law the lease was
valid and the decision of the trustee was “illegal and void.”155
Without citing any authority, the court admitted that the Privy Council had
established that Parliament may pass legislation which encroaches upon a provincial field
“if such legislation is ancillary” to the federal power. In these circumstances the federal
legislation “must prevail.”156 However, the court concluded that s. 52(5) “is not
legislation ancillary nor necessary to the proper and efficacious working of The
Bankruptcy Act.”157 The object of bankruptcy legislation was the distribution of property
and the discharge of the debtor. Here the provision allowed the trustee to expropriate the
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landlord’s right so as to increase the assets of the bankrupt at the landlord’s expense.158
The provision was “outside of the bankruptcy domain.”159 The court ruled that s. 52(5) of
the Bankruptcy Act was “unconstitutional, ultra vires of the powers of the Federal
Parliament [and] null.”160 Shortly, after this decision Parliament conceded victory to the
provinces on this issue by repealing s. 52(5) and replacing it with a section which stated
that in the event of a lessee’s bankruptcy, the rights and priorities of the landlord would
be governed by the laws of the province in which the leased premises were located. The
amending Act went further to state that nothing in the Bankruptcy Act shall be deemed to
limit the legislative authority of any province to regulate landlords’ rights. 161 An article in
La Revue Du Notariat welcomed the repeal of the provision noting that s. 52(5) of the
Bankruptcy Act had interfered with Quebec law.162
The outcomes in Rosenzweig and Stober demonstrate an intention to protect
provincial law from federal interference. A third decision, of the Ontario Court of Appeal
also took issue with the scope of the federal bankruptcy power.163

158

In Re Stober (1923), 4 CBR 34 at para 32 (Que SC).

159

In Re Stober (1923), 4 CBR 34 at para 30 (Que SC).

In Re Western

In Re Stober (1923), 4 CBR 34 at para 34 (Que SC). See Louis-A Pouliot, “La Loi de Faillite et les
Lois Provinciales” (1926-27) 5 R du D 104 at 113.
160

161

Lloyd Houlden, Geoffrey Morawetz & Janis Sarra, Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law of Canada, 4th ed at
para G§124 (WL). See An Act to Amend The Bankruptcy Act SC 1923, c 31, s 31. On the provincial
legislation that followed this amendment see WJ Tremeear, “Rent Priorities in Bankruptcy” (1924-25) 4
CBR 407.
162
163

W. Deschênes, “La loi Canadienne des faillites” (1924) 26: 11 Rev du Notariat 321 at 333.

For a discussion of Ontario relations with the federal government during the 1920s see Christopher
Armstrong, The Politics of Federalism: Ontario’s Relations with the Federal Government, 1867-1942
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1981) at 135-146.

33
Canadian Steel Corp, Chief Justice Meredith164 offered a critical perspective of the
Bankruptcy Act. He suggested that there were provisions of the Bankruptcy Act that
required amendment.165 In obiter, he challenged the Bankruptcy Act’s interference with
the administration of the courts in the provinces. He pointed to the provisions of the
bankruptcy statute which allowed the Minister of Justice to assign judges of provincial
courts to exercise their powers under the Bankruptcy Act. This enabled the federal
government to “cast upon the provinces”166 the expense of providing courts to carry on
work under the Bankruptcy Act. He asked: “Is this not an interference with what is by The
B.N.A. Act within the exclusive legislative authority of the provinces — the
administration of justice in the provinces?”167 Finally, again in obiter he suggested that
there were some provisions “that are probably ultra vires the Dominion Parliament.”168
B. RIGHTS OF JUDGMENT CREDITORS
The rights of judgment creditors in a bankruptcy demonstrated another critical
intersection of the Bankruptcy Act and provincial law. As a fundamental principle, s. 11
Meredith CJ’s decisions have been analyzed by RCB Risk, “Sir William R Meredith, CJO: The Search
for Authority” in G Blaine Baker & Jim Phillips, eds, A History of Canadian Legal Thought: Collected
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of the Bankruptcy Act established that every assignment and receiving order had
precedence over garnishments, attachments, execution or other processes against
property.169 However, the Act carved out an important exception for the rights of secured
creditors who had the power “to realize or otherwise deal with his security”
notwithstanding the bankruptcy.170 Could a judgment creditor, who had taken some
enforcement steps, such as registration of a judgment against the land of the debtor under
provincial law be considered a “secured creditor” in the bankruptcy? In some provinces,
the registration of a judgment entitled the creditor to a proprietary interest in the land. In
a bankruptcy, would this judgment creditor be able to rely upon provincial law to assert
secured creditor status or would the trustee in bankruptcy defeat the creditor’s claim
under s. 11 of the Bankruptcy Act? Having secured creditor status was essential as it
would mean having priority over the trustee in bankruptcy and ranking ahead of
unsecured creditors. The scenario provided a classic conflict between provincial law,
which gave rise to the proprietary interest, and the Bankruptcy Act which took precedence
over execution processes.
A 1927 Canadian Bar Review article articulated a policy perspective in favour of
defeating provincial priority claims. The author argued that the “destruction of judgments
as preferred claims”171 was necessary for the equitable distribution of the bankrupt’s
assets. The provisions of the Bankruptcy Act are:
well within the powers of the Dominion Parliament. Every fictitious lien based on a judgement
set up by provincial statutes must necessarily go down before the paramount federal
Bankruptcy Act, s 11. For early recognition of this problem see “Seizure by a Judgment Creditor After
Assignment in Bankruptcy” (1921-22) 2 CBR 549.
169
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legislation and it is difficult to see how the [Bankruptcy]Act could have been differently
drawn to carry out its manifest purposes more effectually. 172

However, in the early 1920s it was not clear that the courts would adopt this view.
In 1922, the Nova Scotia Supreme Court in Re Fader heard one of the first cases
to consider the status of registered judgments in a bankruptcy.173 Rather than dismissing
the judgment creditor’s claim for secured creditor status in the bankruptcy, the court
gave leave to the judgment creditors to return to court and argue for a declaration of
priority on the basis that their registered judgments entitled them to secured creditor
status in the bankruptcy.174 The following year, the Alberta Court of Appeal indicated
the uncertainty caused by Re Fader:
There has been some question raised as to whether a lienholder, whose lien is created by
virtue of a provincial statute and not by contract, should be treated as coming within the
meaning of a ‘secured creditor,’ as defined by the [Bankruptcy] Act.175

However, this issue was not raised in argument and the Court of Appeal proceeded on the
assumption that the plaintiff was a secured creditor.
The meaning of “secured creditor” became a matter of contention in Nova Scotia
and New Brunswick. Prior to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act, those provinces had
passed legislation providing that a registered judgment became “as effective [as] a lien on
the debtor’s lands as a registered mortgage.”176 If the courts recognized the registered
judgment as a secured creditor then such a claim would have priority over the trustee. In
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Parker-Eakins Co. v Leblanc (Trustee of), the creditor had obtained a judgment and
registered a certificate judgment in the registry of deeds. When the debtor made an
authorized assignment, the creditor argued that he was a secured creditor with valid
security that bound the debtor’s lands notwithstanding the effect of the Bankruptcy Act.
In addition to asserting secured creditor status, the creditor also argued that the
Bankruptcy Act destroyed the effect of his registered judgment under provincial law.
According to the creditor, s. 11 of the Bankruptcy Act, which gave bankruptcy
proceedings priority over execution processes, “was beyond the legislative powers of the
Parliament of Canada.”177
Chisholm J. did not accept the creditors’ arguments and concluded that the
assignment in bankruptcy took precedence over the registered judgment binding lands. A
registered judgment against land was not a charge or lien under the Act’s definition of
secured creditor. A lien mentioned in the definition of secured creditor only meant
consensual arrangements between the parties and not a lien created by the “recovery and
recording of a judgment.”178 On the constitutional argument, Chisholm J. reasoned that
s.11 of the Bankruptcy Act was constitutional. Given that the main purpose of the
Bankruptcy Act was to distribute assets Chisholm J. reasoned that “at every step...there
must be an interference with the subject-matter of property and civil rights within the
province.”179 Parliament had the power:
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to enact, not as ancillary merely to its right to legislate on the subject-matter of bankruptcy but
as indispensable to effective legislation, laws as to how creditors' claims shall rank, and how
debtors' assets shall be distributed.180

Russell J. in dissent, concluded that the holder of the registered judgment was a secured
creditor and therefore had priority over the trustee. However, in reaching his decision
Russell J. expressed his view on the federalism question:
The policy of The Bankruptcy Act is, generally, to pay respect to existing provincial legislation.
Should we not then say that...the lien of the secured creditor shall be preserved? I think this is
the proper answer.181

While the majority in Parker-Eakins had given prominence to the Bankruptcy Act,
a subsequent decision of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court rejected that approach and
reached the opposite conclusion. The court In re Rodenhizer concluded that a creditor
holding a registered judgment was a secured creditor and was therefore entitled to
priority in the bankruptcy. The Court emphasized that in this case there was a consent
judgment that was obtained as security for the loan meaning that the loan and judgment
were obtained at a time when the debtor was solvent. Mellish J. stated that the
Bankruptcy Act “has to do with the estates of insolvents.”
[The Act’s] object is clearly, I think, not to avoid or postpone securities given by solvent
persons for present bona fide consideration.... Legislation with such an object in view would, I
think, come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the local authority and cannot, I think, be said
to be ancillary or incidental to legislation on the subject of bankruptcy or insolvency.

It appears in this case the court was seeking to preserve the local practice of using
consent judgments in the province. Mellish J. A noted that a consent judgment was an
“effective and usual form of security taken by those loaning money to solvent people” in
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Nova Scotia. The decisions in Re Faber and Rodnhizer raised doubts about the interface
between provincial legislation, which treated judgment creditors like secured creditor
rights, and a bankruptcy. A 1927 article cast doubt on the reasoning of these decisions.
Only a proper understanding of the Bankruptcy Act “helps clear away the imaginary
difficulties”182 raised by the cases. The author also offered practical advice for
prospective lenders: “Money lenders who advance money on a judgment which may be
destroyed by bankruptcy instead of insisting on mortgage, which will survive, do so with
full knowledge and have no grievance.”

183

These early lower court decisions did not

resolve the issue of registered judgments in a bankruptcy. A Québec case would
ultimately provide the Privy Council with its first opportunity to make a twentieth
century constitutional pronouncement on the question of whether the Bankruptcy Act
“infringe[d] upon the provincial property and civil rights jurisdiction.”184

C. ROYAL BANK v. LARUE

On January 19, 1928, the Privy Council released its judgment in Royal Bank of
Canada v Larue.185 Although still a member of the Privy Council, Lord Haldane did not
participate in the Larue decision, and the overall result emphasized a broad reading of the
bankruptcy and insolvency power.186 The Privy Council relied upon Lord Herschell’s
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statement in the Voluntary Assignments Case and ruled that the Dominion had the right
under the Bankruptcy Act to postpone creditors’ rights established by provincial law. The
case began in 1922 and would take six years before the Privy Council ruled. The lower
court rulings in Larue demonstrate that a broad reading of the federal bankruptcy power
was not a foregone conclusion. The Québec Superior Court, the Québec Court of Appeal
and a dissenting judge in the Supreme Court of Canada sought to preserve the Quebec
Civil Code from federal interference. Many of the arguments initially raised in the
Quebec National Assembly and in the House of Commons can be found in these three
judgments.

In March of 1922, the Royal Bank obtained a judgment against the debtor and
subsequently registered it. The registration referred to the debtor’s real estate and
established a judicial hypothec on that property in accordance with the Québec Civil
Code. Before the Bank took any steps to enforce the judicial hypothec, the debtor made
an assignment under the Bankruptcy Act. The Bank subsequently filed a claim with the
trustee claiming a “privilege in…the nature of a judicial hypothec upon the real estate of
the debtor.” The trustee rejected the Bank’s claim taking the position that the Bank had
no privileged claim and that an assignment in bankruptcy had precedence over the Bank’s
claim.187 The trustee relied upon s. 11(10) of the Bankruptcy Act, which specifically
referred to judgments operating as hypothecs. The subsection provided that after the
registration of the debtor’s assignment in bankruptcy:
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such… assignment shall have precedence of all certificates of judgment, judgments operating
as hypothecs, executions and attachments against land (except such thereof as have been
completely executed by payment).188

In the Québec Superior Court, the Bank argued that the trustee had misinterpreted
s. 11(10) or in the alternative claimed that the provision was unconstitutional as it
interfered with the Bank’s rights under Québec civil law.189 Lemieux C.J. ultimately
ruled that the Bank was entitled to proceeds from the bankrupt estate up to the amount of
its hypothec. His conclusion ultimately rested upon an interpretation of s. 11(10).
Lemieux C.J. ruled that s. 11(10) gave the trustee the power to realize upon the property
affected by the hypothec but that the creditor holding the hypothec would have a charge
over the proceeds.190
Given his conclusion on the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act, Lemieux C.J.
did not rule that the provision was ultra vires. However, he did go further and stated that
if the subsection were intended to avoid the priority of the bank under the Civil Code, the
provision would fail as it would go beyond the scope of the bankruptcy and insolvency
power.191 In several bold statements Lemieux C.J. echoed the provincial rights’ sentiment
found in the Québec National Assembly debates and the repeal debates in the House of
Commons. First, he reasoned that the Bankruptcy Act did not allow a creditor to be
“stripped of his rights” nor did Parliament have the “power to deprive a citizen” of rights
acquired under civil law. Neither, “the sovereign nor the British Parliament, nor any
188

Bankruptcy Act of 1919, s 11(10).

189

Quebec (Attorney General) v Larue (1924) 5 CBR 560 at para 9 (Que SC).

190

This position is summarized by the Privy Council in Royal Bank of Canada v Larue [1928] AC 187, 8
CBR 579 (PC) at para 6.
191

Summary of Quebec Superior Court of Justice decision in Quebec (Attorney General) v Bélanger,
[1926] SCR 218 at 2, Newcombe J.

41
empire’s parliament will have the power to remove an inch or right, however small it is to
a citizen.”192
The Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the trial judge thus allowing the Bank
to keep the proceeds from the sale of the property.193 Like the trial judge, Lafontaine C.J.
did not rule on the constitutionality of s. 11(10) but he also issued several statements
which sought to protect Québec law. First, he noted that the some of the words in s.
11(10) of the Bankruptcy Act were unknown in Québec’s legal language. Lafontaine C.J.
asserted that this was a “dangerous” matter since one could not “with impunity”
transplant the legal language of one country and seek to impose them on the legal
institutions of another country which had an entirely different legal system. 194 Second, he
sought to preserve the rights of the Bank under the Quebec Civil Code. He opposed any
interpretation which would allow the Bankruptcy Act to have retroactive effect such that a
creditor would lose “earned rights under civil law.”195 The cancellation of a judicial
hypothec “has nothing to do with the operation of bankruptcy law.”196 While the two
lower court decisions had decided the case on the interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act,
both judges indicated that the law would be unconstitutional if the law had encroached
upon the rights of creditors holding hypothecs.197
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The Supreme Court of Canada198 upheld the trustee’s decision thereby
disallowing the Bank’s claim of the judicial hypothec as a privilege in the bankruptcy.
The majority decision, delivered by Newcombe J. upheld s. 11(10) of the Bankruptcy Act
as coming with the Dominion’s power to regulate bankruptcy and insolvency. However,
before turning to the majority decision it is important to highlight the dissenting opinion
of Rinfret J.199 who sided with the position of the Royal Bank and held that the
“destruction of the judicial hypothec” was not part of the bankruptcy and insolvency
power.200 Rinfret J. concluded that the Royal Bank, through its hypothec, had acquired
the status of secured creditor under the Bankruptcy Act.201 Secured creditors remained
“entirely outside the bankruptcy proceedings.”202 Therefore the bankrupt’s property did
not include property affected by the hypothec.203 Rinfret J. was of the view that once the
hypothec had been registered the Royal Bank acquired a real right in the designated
building.204 Section 11(10) of the Bankruptcy Act did not provide the intention to
“deprive a citizen of a completed and acquired right.”205 If hypothecs were only to be
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valid when the debtor was solvent their protection for creditors would only be illusory.
Hypothecs only had any real utility to creditors when the debtor became insolvent. If the
trustee was correct and the Bank’s claim was disallowed, it would effectively remove
hypothecs from the Civil Code.206
Turning to the constitutional question, Rinfret J. concluded that the annulment of
a judicial hypothec before the debtor became insolvent did not have an “essential
relationship” to the bankruptcy and insolvency power. The federal interference with the
hypothec was not a “necessary consequence” of bankruptcy and insolvency. Section
11(10) was not “strictly related to the subject” of bankruptcy or insolvency. Nor was the
provision ancillary to bankruptcy and insolvency. The federal provision was not
necessary for the Dominion Parliament to exercise its bankruptcy power given that it
destroyed the Bank’s rights.207 What concerned Rinfret J. was that the Bank had acquired
certain rights under provincial law prior to the bankruptcy. He concluded that those parts
of s. 11(10) that had the effect of destroying the judicial hypothec were not part of the
federal bankruptcy power.208
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada came to the opposite conclusion
and held that s. 11 was unconstitutional. For the majority, Newcombe J. began his
constitutional analysis by referring back to the two classic nineteenth statements of the
broad bankruptcy power found in Cushing v Dupuy209 and the Voluntary Assignments
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Case.210 In particular, he emphasized Lord Herschell’s statement in the Voluntary
Assignments Case that bankruptcy legislation “required ancillary provisions for the
purpose of preventing the scheme of the Act from being defeated.”211 Newcombe J.
concluded that the Voluntary Assignments Case “clearly recognizes the necessity of”
including within a bankruptcy statute provisions like s. 11(10):
[F]ollowing the view expressed by their Lordships, I hold that these enactments belong or
have strict relation to the subject of bankruptcy and insolvency, and are therefore, as
provisions of The Bankruptcy Act, within the paramount authority of Parliament.212

Newcombe J. allowed the appeal of the trustee and ordered that the trustee’s disallowance
of the Bank’s claim should be restored. The Bank appealed to the Privy Council and for
one Quebec author “the very existence of the judicial hypothec in our Civil Code “was at
stake.213 The Attorney General of Quebec and the Attorney General of Canada
intervened.214
The Bank’s appeal of the Supreme Court judgment provided the first opportunity
for the Privy Council to render a decision on the bankruptcy power in the twentieth
century. The Board agreed with the Supreme Court of Canada’s conclusion.215 Viscount
Cave, the Lord Chancellor, rendered the decision and he posed two questions:
(1) whether on a proper interpretation of the Bankruptcy Act a registered judicial hypothec
under Quebec Civil Code is intended to be postponed to an assignment in bankruptcy.
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(2) If such a hypothec is postponed by a provision of the Bankruptcy whether such provision
is “within the legislative authority of the Dominion Parliament.”216

On the first question, the Privy Council concluded that the Bankruptcy Act did postpone a
judicial hypothec on the real estate of the debtor. It was the intention of the Bankruptcy
Act that the assignment in bankruptcy should have precedence of all judgments operating
as hypothecs. 217
The Privy Council in Larue broadly stated the bankruptcy power and concluded
that judgment creditors were reduced to an equality in a bankruptcy:
[T]heir Lordships are of opinion that the exclusive authority thereby given to the Dominion
Parliament to deal with all matters arising within the domain of bankruptcy and insolvency
enables that Parliament to determine by legislation the relative priorities of creditors under a
bankruptcy or an authorized assignment. A creditor who has obtained judgment for his debt
and has issued execution upon the debtor’s lands or goods remains a creditor; and it is entirely
within the authority of the Dominion Parliament to declare that such a creditor...shall on the
occurrence of bankruptcy...be reduced to an equality with the general body of creditors.218

The Privy Council went further and stated that there was nothing in the nature of a
Québec judicial hypothec which exempted it from the impact of the federal bankruptcy
statute:
No doubt it was within the competence of the provincial Legislature to give to a judicial
hypothec the quality of a real right; but if and so soon as that enactment comes into conflict
with a Dominion statute duly passed under the authority of sec. 91 of the Act of 1867, then the
Dominion statute prevails over the provincial legislation and takes effect according to its
tenor.219

To support this conclusion Viscount Cave L.C. quoted Lord Herschell’s now well-worn
passage from the Voluntary Assignments Case.220 According to Viscount Cave, “Lord
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Herschell’s judgment shows clearly that such an execution [the judicial hypothec] may
lawfully be postponed by the Dominion Act.”221 Looking back to the nineteenth century
Viscount Cave effectively entrenched Lord Herschell’s once obiter statement as part of
Canadian constitutional law. As a result the Privy Council upheld the trustee’s original
decision to dismiss the Bank’s claim.
The reaction to Larue in Quebec was not positive.222 Within weeks of the decision
a Barrister of the Montreal Bar rose in the Quebec National Assembly demanding that
Parliament amend the Bankruptcy Act to allow judicial hypothecs to be recognized in a
bankruptcy.223 In 1928, the Revue du Droit published “Démolisseurs!” in which
Alexandre Gérain-Lajoie, a Quebec lawyer, condemned Royal Bank v Larue as
destructive to Quebec civil law:224
This disastrous, literally inexplicable decision made one more, broader blow in the barrier of
protection that surrounded our provincial law. It was already quite damaged. It falls, of course,
into ruins and no longer offers any security: how could one place its trust in it?225

However, for British constitutional scholar Arthur Berriedale Keith the outcome
in Larue was much more acceptable and perhaps inevitable. Whether the Bankruptcy Act
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could interfere with provincial legislation “seems obviously in the affirmative.”226 The
Privy Council had “already asserted...that the Dominion could deal with the effect of an
execution on property under a Dominion bankruptcy law”227 in the Voluntary
Assignments Case. That answer, however, was not obvious to many prior to 1928 and
perhaps to some even after Larue.228
VII. CONCLUSION
The absence of an established bankruptcy bar made it challenging for a legal
community approaching a bankruptcy statute for the first time. But understanding and
interpreting the new Act was only part of the problem. In 1919, Parliament was
reasserting its jurisdiction in bankruptcy after nearly forty years of provincial regulation
of debtor-creditor law. The abrupt change to federal law meant that the new legislation
would come under attack for interfering with established provincial law. This set the
stage for both political opposition and constitutional challenges to the new paradigm of
federal bankruptcy law. The political debates reflected a belief that Parliament had not
achieved an adequate balance between federal and provincial rights in the Bankruptcy
Act. Rather than relying upon the new federal law, Saskatchewan and Alberta proceeded
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to enact their own debtor relief legislation in response to the regional economic crisis in
those two provinces. The demand for repeal by Québec National Assembly and some
Québec MPs reflected a strong provincial rights perspective. The new Bankruptcy Act
and the federal bankruptcy power threatened provincial law, which had been dominant
over the preceding forty years. When constitutional litigation arose, early cases illustrated
that there was not an overwhelming acceptance of a broad bankruptcy and insolvency
power and the resolution of this constitutional question was not certain as the decade
progressed.
The Privy Council’s decision in Royal Bank v Larue ruled in favour of a broad
bankruptcy power. Larue continued to have influence at the end of the decade.229 In
1929, the Supreme Court of Canada230 cited Larue and quoted at length from the
Voluntary Assignments Case.231 By 1932, the leading bankruptcy text, Bankruptcy in
Canada, 2nd ed., by Lewis Duncan and W.J. Reilley, had inserted Larue into their
chapter, “Bankruptcy and Insolvency under the Canadian Federal System” following
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their discussion of Cushing v Dupuy and the Voluntary Assignments Case. For the
authors, there appeared to be a natural progression from the nineteenth century
jurisprudence to Larue. Reading that text and its summary of leading appellate cases, one
misses the doubt that surrounded the conflict between provincial rights and the federal
bankruptcy power in the 1920s.232
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